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SOME QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ARISING FROM
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.
I.
Failure to Declare War and Alleged Violation of Korean Neutrality.
By AMOS S. HERsHEY,
Associate Professor of European History and Politics, Indiana University.

T

HE
Ru.sso-Japanese
War promto present
an exceptionally
interisespresent
esting and important field for the application
of certain principles of International Law,
more especially for some of those modern
rules governing the rights and duties ,f
neutral States and individuals' which are of
comparatively recent origin and to the
growth of which the United States has so
largely contributed. Certain of these rules
or customs may be said to be still in process
of formation, or have not as yet been ful.y established by the general practice of nations;
others are perhaps no longer observed, and
are therefore of doubtful or decaying validity. International Law is in a state of constant growth as well as of decay; for its rules
are the result of international practice which,
.although based upon fundamental principles,
varies in different times and under different
circumstances. The present war may serve
either to strengthen such customs as are in
a stage of ,formation or of imperfect development on the one hand, or to, weaken such as
are in a state of decay on the other. These
introductory remarks may perhaps serve as
a sufficient apology for a series of articles
which aim to deal with certain questions suggested by the present struggle in the Far
East, from the standpoint of International
Law.
War is an abnormal relation between individuals as well as between States, and its
outbreak brings into, existence an entirely
A number of nice and delicate questions relating to the laws and principles of neutrality
have, in fact, already arisen at the present writ-

ing. Some at least of these will be discussed in
later articles.

new set of rules which regulate the rights
and duties of neutral States and individuals
in respect to belligerent States and individuals, as well as the relations of the belligerents with one another, and which largely
supplement or supplant those rights and
obligations already in existence. In view of
this fact, it becomes extremely important to
fix upon a definite date for the beginning of
these new and abnormal relations between
neutrals and belligerents on the one hand and
the two or more belligerents on the other.
2
A majority of the more recent authorities
on International Law hold that between belligerents a formal notice of intention or a
declaration of war is no longer necessary
prior or preliminary to the outbreak of hostilities. "An act of hostility, unless it be done
in the urgency of self-preservation or by
way of reprisal, is in itself a full declaration
of intention; any sort of previous declaration
therefore is an empty formality unless an
enemy must be given time and opportunity
' A majority of the older authorities insisted
upon the necessity of a declaration in some form.
They were doubtless influenced by traditional
views or customs which had their origin in the
fetial law of the Romans or in the chivalry and
ceremonies of the Middle Ages. The Romans,
e. g., were very strict in their observance of certain formalities connected with the declaration
of war, and they largely measured the justice or
the injustice of a war by the strictness with which
these formalities had been observed.
For a very extensive citation of the older
authorities and historical examples, see Hall,
Treatise on International Law (3d ed.) pp. 37679 and notes. Especially interesting is the citation from Burlamqui (note on p. 379), who naively says that "an enemy ought not to be attacked
immediately after declaration of war, 'otherwise
the declaration would only be a vain ceremony.'*
This is a reductio ad absulrduym cf the view that a
declaration of war is necessary.
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to put himself in a state of defence, and it is
needless to say that no one asserts such
quixotism to be obligatory." '
The date of
the first actual or pronounced hostilities is, in
fact, a better criterion of the commencement
of a war than the date of formal declaration;
for the declaration may have been preceded
by acts of hostility, and in such cases difficult
questions are bound to arise which may lead
to great uncertainty and much long and use2
less controversy.
Although the modern authorities are still
somewhat divided on this question, the genHall, op. cit. p. 374.
"In the eighteenth century declarations were
frequently published several months after letters
of marque had been granted, after general re'
prisals had been ordered, and even after battles
had been fought; and disputes in consequence
took place as to whether war had begun independently of the declaration, or from the date of
the declaration, or in consequence of the declaration, but so as to date, when once declared, retrospectively to the time of the first hostilities.
As the legitimacy of the appropriation of private
property depends upon the existence of a state of
war, it is evident that conflicts of this nature
were extremely embarrassing and, where different theories were in play, were altogether insoluble. To take the state of war on the other
hand as dating from the first act of hostility, only
leads to the inconvenience that in certain case:,
as for example of intervention, a state of war
may he legally set up through the commission of
acts of hostility, which it may afterwards appear
that the nation affected does not intend to resent
by war; and, as in such cases the nation doing
hostile acts can always refrain from the capture
of private property until the ouestion of peace or
war is decided, the practical inconvenience is
small." Hall, op. cit. p. 375.
' For more or less extensive citations of the
modern authorities, see Hall Op. cit. pp. 379-81
and note on p. .38o; Calvo, IV,
59o6; PradierFodere, VI, § 2673. The great French pubTicist,
Pradier-Fodere (VT. § 2677) is of the opinion
that "if declaration is not an essential condition
of a regular war, it is, at least, a useful formality
which States ought not to omit." The great
Russian publicist, De Martens (III, 205), thinks
that "neither proclamation nor diplomatic notice
are obligatory, provided that the state of relatidns is such that hostilities will not be a surprise. Hostilities which constitute a surorise, he
characterizes as brigandage and piracy."
Thu
German Holzendorff (Handbuch, IV, §§ 82-84)
holds neither declaration nor manifesto to be
necessary, although be thinks that "a belligerent
ought to give notice of some sort if he can do so
consistently with his political interest and his
military aims." The last two citations are given
by Hall, note on p. 330.
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eral practice of nations, at least since the
sixteenth century, shows conclusively that
declarations of war prior to the outbreak of
histilities have been comparatively rare and
altogether exceptional. 4 So far as the writer
is aware, the opinion of judges of prize
courts (at least in the United States and
England), who have been called upon to pass
upon the validity of captures made prior to
the declaration of war, is unanimous that war
may exist without a declaration. 5
' "Most of the wars of the seventeenth century began without declaration, though in some
cases declarations were issued during their' continuance." Hall, note on p. 377. "The nearer we
approach to modern times the rarer do formal
declarations become.
There have been only
eleven of them between civilized States since 1700,
whereas the present century has seen over sixty
wars or acts of reprisal begun without formal
notice to the power attacked." Lawrence, p. 300.
In a compilation of cases of hostilities extending from 1700 to the present time, Colonel Maurice of the British army, found but ii out of 118
instances in which a declaration of war precedeu
hostilities. Snow Manal. p. 78. In most cases
declarations have, however, followed the outbreak of hostilities.
For extensive citations of historical examples,
see Hall, cited above; Phillimore, Commentaries,
III, Pt. IX, c. 5; Calvo, IV, § i9o8; Rivier. ii,
pp. 223-28. For an abstract of cases in which
hostilities have occurred between civilized powers
nrior to declaration from 1700 to 1870, see Maurice. Hostilities without Declaration of War
(1882), and a review of this work by Prof. Holland in the Revue de Droit International, i885, No.
6. pp. 61-65. See also Des Hostilikes sans Declaration de Guerre. by M. Feraud-Giraud in the same
review for 1885. No. I, pp. . 9 ff. See also Owen,
Declaration of War, 1899.
It should perhaps be noted that recent wars
seem to have witnessed a return to the older
practice, e. g., those of 187o and 1877. The practical futility of the declaration of 1877 is. however. shown by the fact that Turkish territory
was invaded by Russia on the day of her declaration of war on April 24, 1877. In the ChinaJapanese war of 1894-5, hostilities were begun
before the declaration, and in our own recent
war with Spain war was formally declared by
Congress b n April 25. 1898, after the capture of
several Spanish vessels and the blockade of the
Cuban norts on the 22nd of April. The existence
of hostilities was dated back to the 2ISt of April
by the Declaration itself.
I See, e. g., the opinion of Lord Stowell in I
Dodson 247; of Sir W. Scott in the case of the
Eliza Ann, I Dodson 244: The U. S. Supreme
Court in Bas v. Tingry, A Dallas -37. and in The
Prize Cases, 2 Black. 6,r: Lord Chief Tustice
Mellish in the Teutonia, 4 Privy Council Reports
575: and T. Locke in the Buena Ventura and
Panama, 87 Fed. Rep, 927.
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The utmost that nations in a state of peace
have a right to demand is that they shall not
be suddenly surprised or treacherously attacked without any intimation or warning
whatsoever. But "the use of a declaration
does not exclude surprise"; it only "provides
that notice shall be served an infinitesimal
space of time before a blow is struck ...
The truth is that no forms give security
against disloyal conduct, and that when no
disloyalty occurs States alvays sufficiently
well know when they stand on the brink of
war." 1 War is usually preceded by a long
period of negotiation which generally,
although not necessarily, terminates in an
ultimatum. Moreover, with modern facilities
for telegraphic commuhication, a complete
surprise would be well-nigh impossible.
The mere recall and dismissal of ambassadors or ministers or, in other words, the
breaking off of diplomatic relations, is not
and ought not in itself to be regarded as
equivalent to a declaration of a state of war ;2
but such acts indicate that the relations between the States in question are very much.
strained or altered, and they often form a
sort of transition from a state of peace to
that of war. They are generally preceded
by an ultimatum or final note which usually
prescribes a definite time within which a favorable answer must be returned in order to
prevent a resort to force. In such cases the
ultimatum amounts to a conditional declaration of war, i. c., conditional upon the rejection of the terms proposed or failure to
accept them within the time specified.
For the convenience of neutrals, as also to
warn citizens or subjects of the belligerent
State, it is however customary, in lieu of or
in addition to a declaration, to issue a proHall, p. 381.

See also Lawrence, pp.

301-02;

Woolsey (6th ed.) pp. -iS9-9o; Walker, The
Science of International Law, p. 242; Pradier-Fodere, VI. § 2676; Rivier, II. p. 222; Funck-Bretano
et Sorel, Precis, p. 245; De Martens, Traite, III,
205.
2

220;

Pradier-Fodere, VI, § 2678; Rivier, 711, p.
Funck-Bretano et Sorel, D. 243.

clamation or manifesto which usually sets
forth the causes or motives of the war, but
even these are sometimes omitted.
The foregoing rules or customs are so
well known to students of International Law
and their practice is so generally observed by
modern States that it might perhaps be
deemed unnecessary to restate them here
were it not for the charges of "treachery,"
"piracy," "bad faith," and "breach of International Law" which have been made in certain quarters-high as well as low-against
Japan in consequence of the Japanese attack upon the Russian fleets at Chemulpo
and Port Arthur on February 8th prior to
the formal declaration of war by Japan
against Russia.on February ioth. Not only
have these charges been noised abroad by
the apparently unanimous voice of the
French as well as the Russian press, but the
same opinion is said to be held by leading
authorities on International Law in Paris and
Most serious of all, the
St. Petersburg.
Czar himself is said to-have made himself
the mouthpiece of these charges in public as
well as private utterances, and they have
been presented to the who'e world through
the medium of the Czar's formal Manifesto
of February ioth and Count Lamsdoff's Circular Note. to the Powers of February 22d.'
A brief review of the facts ought to convince the most prejudiced or the most
skeptical that the conduct of Japan in this
matter was entirely correct. It is not our
intention to enter upon a discussion of the
causes of this war with reference to their jUs7
tice or injustice; for International Law as
such is indifferent to causes-it does not
consider the justice or injustice of a war. As
far as International Law is concerned, all
wars are equally just or unjust; or, more
properly speaking, they are neither. International Law merely takes cognizance of the
For these documents, see London Times
(weekly ed.) for February 12th and February 26,
1904.
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existence of war as a fact and prescribes
certain rules and regulations which affect the
rights and duties of neutrals and belligerents
during its continuance. The justice of war
in general or of a certain war in particular are
questions of the gravest importance and the
most vital interest, but they belong to the
domain of international ethizs or morality
rather than to that of International Law.'
In order to justify. the propriety of the
Japanese attack upon the Russian fleets from
the standpoint of International Law, it is
enough for us to show that all peaceful or
diploinatic relations between Japan and
Russia had been severed a sufficient time before the attack, and under such circumstances as to guard against all reasonable
danger of a surprise.
It must have been
reasonably clear to all concerned for months
prior to the outbreak of hostilities that war
was inevitable unless important concessions
should be effected or a compromise agreed
upon which neither State seemed willing to
make. This fact must have been realized at
St. Petersburg as well as at Tokio, and the
long Russian delays- in answering the
Japanese notes during the period of negotiaBluntschli (Droit Iternational Codifie) 5th
ed., § 515, p. 293) expresses a different view.
He says, "War is just when International Law
authorizes recourse to arms; uniust when it is
contrary to the principles of law." He adds in a
note, "this principle is not only a rule of morality,
it is a true principle of law." He admits, however, that it has no great practical value, inasmuch as each of the belligerents is sure to affirm
the justice of its cause, and because there is no
judge to pronounce upon the value of these assertions.
But, as Funck-Bretano et Sorel (Pr'cis, p. 232,
2nd ed.) says, "it is only an abuse of words, in
relying upon the law of nations, to qualify wars
as just or unjust. The law of nations only considers States in their relations with each other.
. . . It is with wars between States as with combats between men; they only commence when all
notion of reciprocal right and justice ceases.
War is a political act.... ..
2 The Japanese proposal of August 12, 1903,
was not answered by a counter-proposal until
October 3d. The answer to the Japanese proposal of October 3oth was delayed until Decem
ber II, 1903. For a history of the negotiations,
see London Times (weekly ed.) for February 12,
1904.
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tions which preceded the outbreak of hostilities can hardly be explained on any other
theory than that Russia desired time for the
completion of her military preparations and
the concentration of her land and naval
forces.', The Russian reply to the last Japanese note of Jan. 13, 19o4, had not been received by February 6th in spite of a request
on the part of the Japanese Government for
a prompt response on account of the gravity
of the situation, and in spite of the repeated
requests for an answer on the part of the M.
Kurino, the Japanese minister at St. Petersburg.'
Under these circumstances the only matter for surprise is that the Japanese Government should have delayed so long (unless it,
too, required more time for military preparations), and it is therefore no. cause for adverse criticism that diplomatic relations with
Russia were abruptly severed on Feb. 6th.
The Russian Government was informed that
"the imperial Government (of Japan) have
no other alternative than to terminate the
present futile negotiations. In adopting this
course the Imperial Government reserve to
thezselrv'es the right to take such indepefdent
action as they may deem best to consolidate and
defend their menaced position, as well as to
protect their established rights and legitimate interests."' This was undoubtedly a suffcieint declaration of intention on the part of
the Japanese Government, and if the Russian fleet or the Rusian Government allowed
themselves to be surprised after such a plain,
albeit diplomatic, intimation of hostile intenI For evidence on this head, see the Japanese
reply to the Russian charges in London Times
(weekly ed.) for March 4, 1904.
4 See the Japanese statement of the case in
the London Times (weekly ed.) for Feb. 12, 1904.
So far as we are aware, the Russian Government
has not denied these facts. The burden of the
Russian complaint is that Japan did not await the
recei)t of the last Russian note which, it is alleged, was on the way to Tokio at the moment
of the rupture of diplomatic negotiations; but it is
not alleged that this note conceded any appre-.
ciable portion of the Japanese demands.
I See N. Y. Times for Feb. 13, 1904.
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tion, the fault, if an), can certainly not be
laid at the door of Japan. Russia can hardly
be accused of such ignorance or inexperience
of the methods of modern diplomacy as is implied in her complaint that Japan began the
attack on Port Arthur without "previously
notifying (us) that the rupture implied the
beginning of warlike action."'
The Japanese attack on the Russian fleets
at Chemulpo and Port Arthur occurred on
February 8th, 2 t. e., over two days after M.
Kurino, the Japanese minister at St. Petersburg, had informed the Russian Government
that Japan had decided to sever diplomatic
intercourse with Russia, and that she reserved to herself the right to "take such
independent action" as was deemed proper
for the protection of her rights and interests. Surely there is here less cause for
the charges of "surprise," "bad faith" and
"treachery" than if Japan had patiently
awaited the Russian note, carefully preserved
the appearance of diplomatic relations, then
suddenly declared war, and immediately followed this declaration by an attack on the
Russian fleet.
Russia also complains of another serious
infraction of International Law on the part
of Japan-viz., of the violation of the neutrality of Korea. In a circular note to the
Powers, sent on Feb. 22d, Count Lamsdorff,
the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
charges Japan with "an open violation of all
customary laws governing the mutual relations between civilized nations." "Without
specifying each particular violation of these
laws on the part of Japan," he calls the most
serious attention of the Powers to the acts
committed by the Japanese Government with
respect to Korea," the "independence and
integrity" of which "was recognized by all
' See the Czar's Manifesto in Londlon Times
(weekly ed.) for February T2, 1904.
2 It
is claimed by the Jananese that the first
shot of the war was fired by a Russian vessel at
Chemulpo; but this point is entirely immaterial,
inasmuch as it was Japan that made the first aggressive movement.

the Powers." In thus violating the neutrality
of Korea, Japan is accused, not only of a violation of treaties, but of a "flagrant breach of
3
International Law," as well.
There can be no doubt but that, according
to the strict letter of the law, Japan has been
guilty of a violation of one of the most fundamental rules of International Law,-viz.,
the right of a sovereign State to remain neutral during a war between other members of
the family of nations,4 and to have its
neutrality and territorial sovereignty respected by the belligerent States. On the other
hand, as the Japanese Government is careful
to point out in its official reply to the Rursian note, "the maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of Korea is one
of the objects of the war, and, therefore, the
dispatch of troops to the menaced territory
was a matter of right and necessity, which
had the distinct consent of the Korean Government."'
This seems to be one of those not altogether rare, although exceptional, cases
where reasons of policy or motives of national interest, if not the necessity of self-preservation, intervene to prevent a strict observance or necessitate a positive violation
of law. The "Monroe Doctrine" of Japan
has long since included Korea as within her
political "sphere of influence" or protection,
and Korea is one of the main objects of the
present war. It was, therefore, just as impossible for Japan to respect the neutrality
of Korea after the opening, or in contemplation of hostilities, as it would be impossible
for the United States to respect the neutrality of a Spanish-American State under similar
3 It is now claimed that it was Russia who first
violated the neutrality of Korea by sending
troops across the Yalu on February 2d. See
London Thnes (weekly ed.) for April I, T904.
4 This right was scarcely recognized in nractice before the modern period and it has often
been violated even in modern times; but it may
now be regarded as one of the best-established
and most fundamental rules of international law.
I See the London Times (weekly ed.) for
March iT, 1904.
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circumstances, e. g., if threatened by a European Power. The complaints of Russia on
this score, although theoretically sound, are
practically absurd.
Russia's real motive in entering this protest is probably to be found in the conclusion,
of Count Lamsdorff's note. "At the same
time, the Imperial Government (of Russia)
considers it necessary to issue a timely warning that, owing to Japan's illegal assumption
of power in Korea, the Government declares
all orders and declarations which may be issued on the part of the Korean Government
to be invalid." In order to raise her position
in Korea above that of a mere military occupant or a vulgar conqueror, Japan has negotiated a treaty with the Korean Government in which she "guarantees the independence and integrity of the Korean Empire,"
(Art. III.) and agrees to, protect Korea
against the "aggressions of a third Power or
internal disturbances."'The Russian Government claims that this
2
treaty is invalid because made under duress.
This raises a very interesting question. Is
the duress here alleged of such sort as. to
render the treaty and all acts performed under its sanction invalid? The rule which applies in such cases is perfectly clear, although
we are not fully informed as to the facts in
this particular case. One of the antecedent
conditions upon which the validity of a treaty
depends is "freedom of consent." But "the
freedom of consent, which in principle is
held as necessary to the validity of contracts
between States as it is to those between individuals, is understood to exist as between
See the London Times (weekly ed.) for
March 4, 1904, for the text of the treaty between

Japan and Korea.
'The Russian Novosti has published a statement

from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declaring

that "Russia does not consider Korea as a belligerent State, but simply as a neutral State acting

under violent pressure from Japan and deprived
of the power, of free action." For this reason,
it is said, "Russia cannot regard as valid any
treaty concluded by Korea for the benefit of
Japan, nor any abrogation of Russian conces-

sions."

See London Times for March 25, 1904.
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the former under conditions which would not
be thought compatible with it where individuals are concerned. In International Law force
and intimidation are permitted means of obtaining redress for wrongs, and it is impossible to look upon permitted means as vitiating the agreement, made in consequence of
their use, by which redress is provided for.
Consent, therefore, is conceived to be freely
given in international contracts, notwithstanding that it may have been obtained by
force, so long as nothing more is exacted
than it may be supposed that a State would
consent to give, if it were willing to afford
compensation for past wrongs and security
against the future commission of wrongful
acts. And as International Law cannot measure what is due in a given case, or what is
necessary for the protection of a State which
declares itself to be in danger, it regards all
contracts as valid, notwithstanding the use of
force and intimidation, which do not destroy
the independence of the State which has been
obliged to enter into them. When this point,
however, is passed, constraint vitiates the
agreement, because it cannot be supposed
that a State would voluntarily commit suicide by way of reparation or as a measure of
protection to another. The doctrine is of
course one which gives a legal sanction to
an infinite number of agreements, one of the
parties to each of which has no real freedom
of will; but it is obvious that unless a considerable degree of intimidation is allowed
to be consistent with the validity of contracts,
few treaties made at the end of a war or to
avert one would be binding, and the conflicts
of States would end only with the subjugation of one of the 8combatants or the utter
exhaustion of both."
In the treaty between Japan and Korea,
the "independence and territorial integrity"
of Korea are carefully and explicitly provided for, so that there can be no objection
to the validity of the treaty on this score.
Hall, op. cit.. 3d ed., pp. 325-26.

